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Heterogeneous Beliefs and Risk Neutral Skewness 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This study tests whether investor belief differences affect the cross-sectional variation of 
risk-neutral skewness, using data on firm-level stock options traded on the CBOE from 
2003 to 2006. Using well known proxies for heterogeneous beliefs, we find that stocks 
with greater belief differences have more negative skews, even after controlling for 
systematic risk and other firm-level variables known to affect skewness. This result also 
goes beyond the net price pressure hypothesis suggested by Bollen and Whaley (2004).  
Factor analysis identifies latent variables linked to systematic risk and belief differences.  
The belief factor explains more variation in the risk-neutral density than the risk-based 
factor. Our results suggest that belief differences may be one of the unexplained firm-
specific components affecting skewness described in Dennis and Mayhew (2002).   
 
*We thank John Geppert, Richard DeFusco, Manferd Peterson, Kathy Farrell, Donna 
Dudney, Emre Unlu, Tisha Friesen and seminar participants at the University of 
Nebraska, the 2008 FMA Annual Meeting, the referee and the editor for helpful 
comments and suggestions.   
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I.  Introduction 
Under no-arbitrage assumptions, the price of an option equals the expected payoff 
under a risk-neutral probability distribution, discounted at the risk-free rate.  It is well 
documented that risk-neutral densities, imputed from observed option prices, tend to be 
more negatively skewed than are the lognormal distributions of Black and Scholes 
(1973).  This negative skewness is linked by a one-to-one correspondence to variation in 
the implied volatilities across strike prices, as measured by the “slope” of the implied-
volatility curve.  Risk-neutral skewness and the implied-volatility slope capture the same 
underlying object, though measurement of the latter is subject to a number of known 
biases.1  
Empirical work by Dennis and Mayhew (2002), Lemmon and Ni (2008), Duan 
and Wei (2009) and Taylor et al. (2009) shows that skewness is related to systematic risk, 
market volatility, market sentiment and a number of firm-level variables including size, 
liquidity and trading volume.  In addition, Dennis and Mayhew (2002, p. 492) note that in 
explaining skewness, there exists an “unexplained firm-specific component more 
important than all other explanatory variables put together.” Though yet untested, 
theoretical work from Shefrin (2001), Ziegler (2003) and Buraschi and Jiltsov (2006) 
                                                 
1 An earlier version of this paper entitled “Heterogeneous Beliefs and the Option Implied Volatility Smile” 
looked at the relationship between belief differences and the slope of the option implied volatility smile.  
The results were qualitatively similar to those reported in the current paper, as one might expect given the 
strong correlation between the volatility smile and the skew of the risk neutral density function (BKM, 
2003).  However, the current paper focuses on the risk-neutral skewness because at the firm level, the 
cross-sectional variation in the implied volatility measure is vulnerable to the following criticisms:  First, it 
is model specific; second, the smile slope may be affected by cross-sectional variation in the range of 
observed strike prices, as well as measurement error in the prices of deep out-of-the-money options. 
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predicts that investor belief differences will affect option prices, the slope of the implied 
volatility smile and the skewness of the risk neutral density function.  
This study tests the hypothesis that heterogeneous beliefs among investors affect 
skewness of the risk-neutral distribution as imputed from observed option prices.  In 
particular, we examine whether investor belief differences are one of the unexplained 
components alluded to by Dennis and Mayhew (2002).  We test this hypothesis, which is 
a key prediction of the Buraschi and Jiltsov (2006) model, using a sample of firm-level 
option data for 856 firms traded on the Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE) from 
2003 to 2006.  Following Dennis and Mayhew (2002), our skewness measure is 
calculated from out-of-the-money (OTM) options using the methodology of Bakshi, 
Kapadia and Madan (2003) (henceforth BKM).  
Our use of firm-level stock options has an important advantage over studies that 
examine only index options (e.g. Buraschi and Jiltsov, 2006; Han, 2008).  Han (2008) 
finds that while institutional investor sentiment affects index option prices, individual 
investor sentiment does not.  Lemmon and Ni (2008) confirm this result, but also show 
that individual investors are important participants in option markets for individual 
stocks.    Firm-level options data enables us to examine the impact of individual investors 
on option prices, and test the cross-sectional prediction of Buraschi and Jiltsov (2006) 
that risk-neutral skewness will be more negative for those assets with greater belief 
differences. 
In our empirical analysis, we use several variables commonly used as proxies for 
investor belief differences.  We find that stocks with greater open interest in OTM 
options, greater dispersion in financial analysts’ earnings forecasts, greater idiosyncratic 
volatility, and higher trading volume have more negative skews. The skew is also more 
negative for small stocks and growth stocks (low earnings-to-price ratio) relative to large 
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stocks and income stocks (high earnings-to-price ratio).  These results lend support to the 
hypothesis that the risk neutral skewness is related to belief differences among investors.  
We also examine the importance of belief differences in explaining skewness, 
relative to the other variables in the literature.  To obtain a measure of belief differences 
more robust than a collection of individual proxies, we conduct a factor analysis using 
firm-level data. Two latent factors are identified. The first factor is highly loaded on firm 
size, open interest and stock trading volume. We suggest that this factor can be linked to 
the systematic risk factor proposed by Duan and Wei (2009). The second factor is highly 
loaded on dispersion in financial analysts’ earnings forecasts, idiosyncratic volatility and 
the earnings-to-price ratio, and appears to reflect investor belief differences.    
Using the latent factor for belief differences as a cleaner measure than the 
individual proxies, we examine the relationship between belief differences and risk 
neutral skewness. We find a strong relationship between the skew and the belief 
differences factor, with stronger results than those produced in regressions using 
individual proxy variables.  The latent factor for belief differences also explains more 
variation in the risk neutral density than the risk factor.  This is consistent with the 
finding of Dennis and Mayhew (2002) that firm-specific factors are more important than 
systematic risk in explaining the skew, and suggests that belief differences may be the   
unexplained determinant of risk-netural skewness described in their study. 
The hypothesis that heterogeneous beliefs cause greater skewness in option prices 
is related to the price pressure hypothesis examined by Bollen and Whaley (2004).  
Specifically, it is possible that belief differences simply cause investors to trade in ways 
that put pressure on option prices, moving them away from the price they would have if 
options were priced by dynamic arbitrage.  It is also possible that belief differences cause 
equilibrium option prices to have greater skew in the absence of price pressure.  To 
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examine this, we look at the sensitivity of skewness to dispersion in beliefs as a function 
of the liquidity of the option.  We find that skewness is more sensitive to belief 
differences for the less liquid options, but that the relationship between belief differences 
and skewness holds, after controlling for option liquidity.  This suggests that the effect of 
belief differences on skewness goes beyond the net price pressure suggested by Bollen 
and Whaley (2004). 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section II describes related literature 
regarding the risk neutral skewness. Section III develops hypotheses on the relation 
between heterogeneous beliefs and the risk neutral skewness. Section IV describes data 
and empirical methodology. Section V presents empirical results. Section VI discusses 
the empirical results and Section VII concludes this study.  
 
II. Related Literature  
Some explanations of the volatility smile and risk neutral skewness focus on 
violations of assumptions made by the Black-Scholes model. These violations include 
non-lognormally distributed returns or non-constant volatility (Hull (1993)).  Hull and 
White (1988) and Heston (1993) suggest that the volatility smile reflects stochastic 
volatility. Pena et al. (1999) show that transaction costs also affect the curvature of the 
volatility smile.  BKM (2003) show that leptokurtic returns cause the Black-Scholes 
model to misprice out-of-the-money (OTM) and in-the-money (ITM) options.   
A second class of studies focuses on the importance of firm-specific and 
systematic factors in explaining the skews in the risk neutral density of individual firm 
stock options. Dennis and Mayhew (2002) find the volatility skews are affected by 
liquidity and market risk measured by beta and size.  Duan and Wei (2009) find that 
higher systematic risk leads to a steeper implied volatility slope.  Skewness may also be 
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related to a firm’s leverage.  As a company’s equity value declines, leverage increases, 
the equity becomes more risky and its volatility increases. Toft and Prucyk (1997) find 
more highly levered firms have negative skews.  
Bollen and Whaley (2004) find net buying pressure determines the shape of the 
volatility smile, which they attribute to arbitrage limits. For individual stock options the 
shape of the implied volatility function is directly related to net buying pressure from call 
option demand.  Li (2007) develops a model of option pricing in an economy in which 
investors have different time preferences and heterogeneous beliefs about dividend 
growth rates. The pattern of the implied volatility depends on beliefs, time preferences 
and relative wealth of investors. When pessimistic investors hold a relatively large 
portion of total wealth the implied volatility exhibits a “skew”; when optimistic investors 
hold a relatively large portion of total wealth the implied volatility exhibits a “smile”.  
Han (2008) shows a significant relationship between time-variation in market sentiment 
and the slope of the volatility smile and risk neutral skewness.  Lemmon and Ni (2008) 
find the time-series variation in the volatility smile slope is related to the investor 
sentiment.  
Recent theories suggest that belief differences among investors could affect 
option prices.  Shefrin (2001) demonstrates that investor sentiment affects the pricing 
kernel so that the log stochastic discount factor (SDF) is U-shaped rather than 
monotonically decreasing, as assumed in standard asset pricing models. The U-shape in 
the log-SDF gives rise to a volatility smile.  Ziegler (2003) shows that investor belief 
differences can impact equilibrium state-price densities.  Buraschi and Jiltsov (2006) 
develop an option pricing and volume model in which agents have heterogeneous beliefs 
about expected returns and face model uncertainty. In their model, optimistic investors 
demand out-of-the-money calls while pessimistic investors demand out-of-the-money 
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puts.
  
They show that heterogeneous beliefs about the dividend growth rate affect option 
prices and volume, and produce a volatility smile and a negatively skewed risk neutral 
density function. The implication of all three studies is that investor belief differences 
may affect option prices through the slope of the implied volatility smile and the 
skewness of the risk neutral density function.  
 
III. Hypothesis Development 
Our study seeks to examine the relationship between belief differences and risk 
neutral skewness. While theoretical models provide a motivation for our empirical work, 
our empirical findings do not depend on the validity of any particular model.  The first 
proxy we consider for heterogeneous beliefs is open interest on options. The put/call open 
interest ratio is commonly used as a measure of investor sentiment: more put open 
interest indicates pessimism while more call open interest indicates optimism.  
Hypothesis I: Stocks with greater OTM option open interest have more negative 
skews.  
The most widely used proxy for heterogeneous beliefs in previous studies is the 
dispersion in financial analysts’ earnings forecasts, e.g. Diether et al. (2002) and Doukas 
et al. (2004). Goetzmann and Massa (2003) show that differences in investors’ beliefs are 
correlated with dispersion in financial analysts’ opinions. Therefore, stocks with a greater 
dispersion in financial analyst earnings forecasts are expected to have more negative 
skews.  
Hypothesis II: Stocks with a greater dispersion in financial analysts’ earnings 
forecasts have more negative skews.  
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Another common proxy for heterogeneous beliefs is stock idiosyncratic volatility. 
Shalen (1993), He and Wang (1995) and Biais and Bossaerts (1998) suggest a positive 
link between heterogeneous beliefs and volatility. Empirically, Harris and Raviv (1993) 
and Deither et al. (200) find stocks with a higher dispersion of opinion have higher 
volatility. Therefore stocks with higher idiosyncratic volatility are expected to have more 
negative skews.  
Hypothesis III: Stocks with a greater idiosyncratic volatility have more negative 
skews.  
 Stock trading volume is also used as a proxy for heterogeneous beliefs by Harris 
and Raviv (1993), Kandel and Pearson (1995), Odean (1998) and Hong and Stein (2003). 
Since belief differences induce trading, stocks with more divergent beliefs among 
investors tend to induce greater trading volume.  
Hypothesis IV: Stocks with greater trading volume have more negative skews.  
Diether et al. (2002) and Baik and Park (2003) find that investor’ belief 
differences tend to be greater for small firms than large firms. Because financial analysts 
and the financial press tend to follow large firms, investors may have less information 
about smaller firms and therefore more divergent beliefs as firm size decreases.  
Hypothesis V: Small stocks have greater negative skews than large stocks.  
In the equity market, shares of companies that are growing at an above average 
rate relative to the market or their industry are commonly called growth stocks. Growth 
stocks normally pay smaller dividends than income stocks. Growth stocks may therefore 
have greater heterogeneity in investor beliefs about dividend growth rates compared to 
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income stocks. One common method to distinguish growth stocks and income stocks is 
the earnings-to-price ratio.2  Baik and Park (2003) find stocks with lower earnings-to-
price ratios have more dispersion in financial analysts’ earnings forecasts, consistent with 
the idea that growth stocks have greater belief heterogeneity. Thus the sixth hypothesis: 
Hypothesis VI: Growth stocks have greater negative skews than income stocks.  
Conversely, the earnings-to-price ratio should be positively related to the skew. 
If multiple proxy variables are related to heterogeneous beliefs, the underlying 
belief differences should be identifiable using factor analysis. If a latent factor for 
heterogeneous beliefs is successfully identified, we can estimate the factor as the linear 
combination of proxy variables using factor score coefficients. Therefore our last 
hypothesis is:    
Hypothesis VII: The latent factor for heterogeneous beliefs is negatively related to 
the skew. 
IV. Data and Methodology 
 A. Data and Risk Neutral Sknewness Measure 
                                                 
2 Another measure for the growth stock is the book-to-market ratio.  Diether et al. (2002), Baik and Park 
(2003) and Doukas et al. (2004) find that stocks with high book-to-market ratios have larger dispersion in 
financial analysts’ earnings forecasts than stocks with low book-to-market ratios, indicating the value 
stocks have greater belief heterogeneity than growth stocks. Therefore we include it as a proxy for 
heterogeneous beliefs in the subsequent empirical analysis. However the book-to-market ratio is also 
believed by some to be a priced risk factor and we later find its relation with the skew is more attributable 
to the risk component than belief difference component. 
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This study uses a dataset from options traded on the Chicago Board Options 
Exchange (CBOE) from 2003 to 2006.3 The dataset contains daily option data including 
trading date, expiration date, strike price, last-trade price, closing bid and asked quotes, 
volume, open interest, implied volatility and the underlying security price. We use the 
risk neutral skewness metric of BKM (2003) and follow the empirical methodology of 
Dennis and Mayhew (2002) to construct the skewness measure.4  
We use the trapezoidal approximation to estimate the integrals in the BKM 
measure of skewness with discrete option data.  Using the midpoint of the closing bid and 
asked prices for each contract5, we compute the BKM skewness measure each day for the 
two different maturities that are greater than seven days but closest to twenty-two trading 
days. Equal numbers (at least two) of OTM puts and calls for each stock for each day are 
used. In the sample, the average number of OTM puts/calls used for estimating the BKM 
measure of skewness is 3.4.  A hypothetical option with twenty-two trading days to 
maturity is constructed using linear interpolation or extrapolation. We then average the 
daily skewness measures to obtain a weekly measure.  
B. Explanatory Variables 
 We compute the weekly OTM open interest by averaging daily total OTM open 
interests over the week. Following Diether et al. (2002), the dispersion in financial 
                                                 
3 The data is provided by deltaneutral.com. The dataset is called NBBO (National Best Bid Offer) dataset 
from OPRA (Option Pricing Report Authority) who collect data from the CBOE. ITM option prices are 
checked and bad prices are marked as irregularities in the dataset. 
4 Additional computational details are available from the authors upon request 
5 Dennis and Mayhew (2002) discussed the bias introduced by the discreteness of the strike price interval. 
Most of our data have a strike price interval of $2.50 or $5.00. So bias is roughly the same for all the 
observations in our sample. 
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analysts’ earnings forecasts is measured as the standard deviation of forecasts for 
quarterly earnings scaled by the absolute value of the mean earnings forecast. The data on 
financial analysts’ earnings forecasts are taken from the Institutional Brokers Estimate 
System (I/B/E/S) summary history dataset. Only the most recent statistical summary is 
adopted. To ensure the forecast is current, only the forecast period of one quarter (FPI=6) 
is selected. Firms with a zero mean forecast or without a standard deviation are excluded. 
 Firms’ financial ratios are constructed using data from the Compustat Industrial 
Quarterly File. Firm size is measured as the natural logarithm of market capitalization. 
(The earnings-to-price ratio is measured by quarterly earnings (Data 27) divided by the 
stock price. The book-to-market ratio is the book value of common equity (Data 59) 
divided by the stock price. Stock return and volume data are obtained from the Center for 
Research in Securities Prices (CRSP). The idiosyncratic volatility is calculated by 
regressing daily returns over the last 200 days on the daily returns of value-weighted 
index (including distributions) using the market model. We also obtain the beta from the 
regression and include it as a control variable because Dennis and Mayhew (2002) find a 
negative relation between the beta and the skew.  
  Taylor et al. (2009) show that option and stock liquidity affects the risk neutral 
skew of individual firms. The daily trading volume of OTM options is used as a proxy for 
the liquidity of options. Taylor et al. (2009) use stock volume as the proxy for stock 
liquidity. Because stock volume is used in our study as a proxy for heterogeneous beliefs, 
we use an alternative measure of liquidity of stocks: the bid-ask spread of the stock 
closing prices, estimated daily as the (asked price – bid price) / asked price. Stocks with 
high liquidity are expected to have a less negative skew. In addition, leverage can affect 
the risk neutral skewness as argued by Geske (1979) and Toft and Prucyk (1997). The 
leverage is defined as the debt-to-equity ratio, computed as the long term debt (Data 51) 
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divided by the market capitalization. All daily measures are averaged to obtain a weekly 
measure.  
  To consider how the risk neutral skewness of individual stocks is affected by the 
market-wide factors, we also include a market volatility variable. To maintain 
consistency with our estimation of idiosyncratic volatility, market volatility is measured 
as the standard deviation of daily returns for the value-weighted market index (including 
distributions) over the last 200 days and then is averaged weekly.  
C. Factor Analysis Methodology 
We combine seven proxy variables for heterogeneous beliefs to extract the 
underlying latent variable for heterogeneous beliefs. The factor model in matrix form is 
assumed to be: 
( 1 )      fz         
where z is the vector of standardized proxies, f is the factor vector with zero means and 
one variances;  is the matrix of factor loading and   is independent of the factor vector. 
The factor model implies that  
( 2 )    )()( CovzCov   
The goal of factor analysis is to find   and  that satisfy the factor analysis equations 
(2). Because the units across the seven proxies vary by several orders of magnitude, using 
raw data leads to over-weighting some proxies because their scale makes them seem 
much more variable than other proxies. Therefore the Spearman correlation matrix is 
applied, which is similar to standardizing the data by subtracting the mean and then 
dividing by standard deviation.  
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We adopt two common methods for solving the factor analysis equations: the 
principal factor method and the maximum likelihood method.6 We follow the common 
practice of rotating factors to facilitate their interpretation, which normalizes as many of 
the factor loadings as closely as possible to zero. We adopt the Kaiser (1958) Varimax 
orthogonal rotation method which ensures that factors are uncorrelated with each other. 
We then estimate the factor as the linear combination of proxy variables using factor 
score coefficients:     
( 3 )    zSf *    
where S is the factor score coefficient matrix.   
 
V. Empirical Results 
A. Results Based on Proxy Variables 
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for variables. The sample includes 67,910 
weekly observations of 856 unique firms during January 2003 to December 2006. Due to 
the large variation in the skew, the upper and lower 5% of the skew is trimmed. The 
number of firms in the sample increases from 572 in 2003, 674 in 2004, 779 in 2005, to 
788 in 2006. The median skew for all four years is –1.484. The skew levels over our 
sample period are similar to those reported in Conrad et al. (2008). They examine 
skewness over the 1996 to 2005 period, but their results are much more negative than the 
average skew reported by Dennis and Mayhew (2002) derived over the earlier 1986 to 
                                                 
6 A factor analysis initially requires suitable estimates of the communalities. The communality estimate for 
a variable is the proportion of the variance of each variable that is explained by the common factors. We 
choose one common approach to set the prior communality estimate for each variable to its squared 
multiple correlation of each variable with all remaining variables. 
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1996 period.7  While not the focus of the current study, an interesting avenue for future 
research is to study the cause of increasing skewness of individual stock options 
especially since 2003.   
[Insert Table 1 here] 
The average daily OTM open interest of our sample is 9,000 contracts. The 
average dispersion in financial analysts’ earnings forecasts is 0.067. The average 
idiosyncratic volatility of the sample is 2.7% and the average daily stock trading volume 
of about 683 thousand shares. Most stocks in our sample are of medium and large 
capitalization. Most small stocks do not have options or are not followed by financial 
analysts. The average firm size in the sample is about $1 billion. Our sample has an 
average earnings-to-price ratio of 0.024 and an average book-to-market ratio of 0.298. 
The average daily OTM option volume in our sample is about 230 contracts while the 
average bid ask spread of the stocks in our sample is 3.7%. The mean leverage is 0.14 
with a large number of firms in the sample having no long-term debt. Our sample has an 
average beta of 1.479. During our four year study period, the average daily market 
volatility is 0.7%. 
Table 2 presents the correlations between variables of interests. The skew is 
positively correlated to option volume and negatively correlated to bid-ask spread,   
indicating high liquidity in either options or stocks lead to less negative skews. This is 
consistent with the finding of Dennis and Mayhew (2002). The skew is negatively 
correlated with leverage, supporting the leverage argument that stocks with high leverage 
have more negative skews. The negative correlation between the skew and beta is 
                                                 
7 In the paper of Conrad et al. (2008), the median skew is  –1.297 for 2003, –1.399 for 2004 and –1.609 for 
2005, which is much more negative than previous years: –0.742 for 2002, –0.648 for 2001, –0.562 for 
2000, –0.601 for 1999, –0.464 for 1998, –0.539 for 1997 and –0.449 for 1996. 
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consistent with the findings of both Dennis and Mayhew (2002) and Taylor et al. (2009). 
The correlations between the skew and proxies for heterogeneous beliefs also have their 
predicted signs. The skew is negatively related to the open interest on options, dispersion 
in financial analysts’ earnings forecast, the stock’s idiosyncratic risk, trading volume and 
the book-to-market ratio while positively related to firm size and the E/P ratio. These 
correlations imply that firms with greater divergence in investor beliefs have a more 
negatively skewed risk neutral density. Also, the skew of individual stocks is negatively 
related to market volatility, suggesting that the risk neutral density for individual stocks 
options is more negatively skewed when the market is more volatile.  
[Insert Table 2 here] 
Several high correlations deserve attention:  firm size with option volume (0.462), 
liquidity (–0.40), open interest (0.55), idiosyncratic volatility (0.48) and stock volume 
(0.49); open interest with option volume (0.735), and stock volume (0.773); idiosyncratic 
volatility with liquidity (0.57); leverage with the book-to-market ratio (0.657). These 
correlations indicate a possible collinearity problem in subsequent regression analysis. 
We begin our cross-sectional analysis of the risk neutral skew by running the 
Fama-MacBeth (1973) two stage regressions. For each week, we run the cross sectional 
regressions of the following form:  
( 4 ) 
iiiiii βββββα PROXYBETALEVERAGELIQUIDITYMEOPTIONVOLUSKEW 54321 
 
Where SKEW is the skew of the risk neutral density for the firm, OPTIONVOLUME is 
the trading volume of OTM options, LIQUIDITY is the bid ask spread on the firm stock, 
LEVERAGE is the debt ratio of the firm and BETA is the firm’s beta on stock returns 
obtained from the model. PROXY is one of the seven variables representing 
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heterogeneous beliefs: including OTM open interest, the dispersion in financial analysts’ 
forecast, idiosyncratic volatility, stock trading volume, firm size, the earnings-to-price 
and book-to-market ratio.  
 The cross-sectional regressions generate 208 weekly estimates of coefficients. 
The time series averages of each coefficient with Newey-West t-statistics are reported in 
Table 3. For reference, column (1) includes only control variables. The skew is positively 
related to option volume and is negatively related to the bid ask spread, implying that 
liquidity in either stocks or options reduces the skewness of the risk neutral density. The 
skew is negatively related to leverage, supporting the asserted effect of leverage on 
option prices. The negative coefficient on beta indicates a negative relationship between 
the skew and systematic risk, consistent with the findings of previous studies.  
[Insert Table 3 here] 
To test our first hypothesis, open interest on OTM options is added into the 
regression. Column (2) shows that the coefficient on open interest is significantly 
negative (–2.478), supporting the hypothesis that stocks with more OTM option open 
interest have more negative skews. Column (3) shows that the dispersion in financial 
analysts’ forecasts is significantly negatively related to the skew, supporting our second 
hypothesis that stocks with greater divergence of opinion have more negative skews. 
Column (4) shows the significantly negative coefficient on idiosyncratic volatility, 
indicating stocks with larger volatility are associated with more negative skews, 
supporting hypothesis III. This result is consistent with Taylor et al. (2009) but is 
contrary to Dennis and Mayhew (2002). 
The negative coefficient (–0.055) on stock trading volume in Column (5) shows 
stocks with higher volume have more negative skews. This result is consistent with 
Taylor et al. (2009) but again contrary to Dennis and Mayhew (2002).  Both of those 
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studies use trading volume as a proxy for liquidity, but in our regression liquidity is 
already controlled for using the bid-ask spread. Thus, after controlling for liquidity the 
stock volume captures the effect of heterogeneous beliefs. The regression results thus 
support hypothesis IV. Also as predicted, small firms have more negative skews than 
large firms while growth stocks (low E/P ratios) have more negative skews than income 
stocks, as shown in column (6) and (7), supporting hypothesis V and VI respectively. 
Small firms and growth stocks are subject to a greater divergence of opinion among 
investors.  The results support the argument that stocks with greater belief heterogeneity 
are more negatively skewed. The skew is negatively related to the book-to-market ratio, 
suggesting greater negative skew among value firms. 
 We further combine all proxy variables into the cross-sectional regressions. The 
coefficients of the variables retain their predicted signs, although multicollinearity 
reduces the significance of the coefficient on idiosyncratic volatility. The mean adjusted 
R-square increases to 16.74% from a range of 5.37% to 8.69% in the regressions that 
included only one proxy variable. 
 Following Dennis and Mayhew (2002), we also estimate a pooled cross-sectional 
time-series regression to explore how skews of individual firms vary over time and are 
affected by market volatility. Market volatility and a lagged skew are included in the 
regression as additional explanatory variables. The results are reported in Table 4. The 
skew of individual firms is negatively related to market volatility. Our results are 
consistent with the results of Dennis and Mayhew (2002) and Taylor et al. (2009).  
Including the lagged skew in the analysis significantly increases the explanatory power of 
the regression to about 70%. The sign and the significance of the estimated coefficients 
for the firm specific variables remain the same as the cross-sectional estimates reported in 
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Table 3 (exceptions are the liquidity and market volatility variables, whose coefficients 
become positive or insignificant due to the multicollinearity described earlier). 
[Insert Table 4 here] 
Table 5 presents mean and median skews for quintiles sorted on a particular proxy 
for heterogeneous beliefs: open interest, dispersion in financial analysts’ earnings 
forecasts, idiosyncratic volatility, stock trading volume, size, the earnings-to-price ratio 
and the book-to-market ratio. Table 5 Panel A shows that the quintiles of greater 
dispersion in financial analysts’ earnings forecasts and higher idiosyncratic volatility 
have more negative skews while small capitalization quintile, low earnings-to-price ratio 
quintile and higher book-to-market ratios have more negative skews. The skew 
differentials between the highest and the lowest quintile are statistically significant, 
consistent with the argument that firms with greater investor belief differences have more 
negative skews.  
[Insert Table 5 here] 
The skewness-ranked quintiles for open interest and stock volume do not appear 
as a monotonic trend but exhibit a kind of U-shape in the skew. Both open interest and 
trading volume are highly correlated with firm size, as indicated by the high correlation 
coefficients reported in Table 2. Hence, it is unclear whether or not the pattern reflects a 
size effect. In order to remove the size effect, we run separate regressions for open 
interest and stock volume on firm size and obtain residuals from each regression that are 
orthogonal to firm size. Stocks are then sorted into quintiles based on the residuals. 
Results presented in Table 5 Panel B are consistent with hypotheses I and IV.  
Each of the belief proxies utilized above are at best noisy measures of investor 
beliefs. For example, stock trading volume is also used to proxy for liquidity while size is 
also used to proxy for systematic risk. If the observable proxy variables for 
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heterogeneous beliefs capture the unobservable differences in beliefs, a latent variable 
should be identifiable.  The latent variable will be a less noisy measure of heterogeneous 
beliefs than the individual proxy variables.  
 
B. Results of Factor Analysis 
  We apply factor analysis to the Spearman correlation matrix of the seven proxies 
for heterogeneous beliefs because of the different scales of the variables. The factor 
analysis produces two factors using either the principal factoring or maximum likelihood 
method. The factor extraction criterion is that the cumulative proportion of common 
variance is greater or equal to one. Results for the principal factoring method are 
presented in Table 6 Panel A. The factor pattern shows that the first factor is highly 
positively loaded with open interest (0.75), stock volume (0.79) and size (0.91) while 
negatively loaded with dispersion in analysts’ forecasts (–0.30), idiosyncratic volatility (–
0.42) and the book-to-market ratio (–0.31).8 These factor loadings are consistent with the 
presence of an underlying size factor because large firms tend to have more option open 
interest and higher trading volume but less dispersion in analysts’ forecasts and less 
idiosyncratic volatility. 9 This factor explains about 71% of common variance. 
[Insert Table 6 here] 
  The second factor is highly positively loaded with open interest (0.37), dispersion 
in financial analysts’ earnings forecasts (0.38), idiosyncratic volatility (0.57) and stock 
                                                 
8 As is standard in factor analysis, we refer to a variable as highly loaded on a factor if its loading on the 
factor is greater than 0.3. 
9 The correlation between the firm size and factor 1 extracted using the principal factoring method and the 
maximum likelihood method is 0.91 and 0.97 respectively, which leads us to interpret the factor 1 as a size 
factor.  
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volume (0.33) but negatively loaded with firm size (–0.15), the earnings-to-price ratio (–
0.49) and the book-to-market ratio (–0.15). This factor captures the characteristics of 
heterogeneous beliefs as all the loadings of proxy variables (except the book-to-market 
ratio) on this factor have their predicted signs on heterogeneous beliefs. Open interest, 
dispersion, idiosyncratic volatility, stock volume have positive loadings on the second 
factor, consistent with the prediction that stocks with greater belief differences have 
larger OTM option open interest, greater dispersion in financial analysts’ earnings 
forecasts, higher idiosyncratic volatility and more trading volume on stocks. Firm size 
and the earnings-to-price ratio have negative loadings on the second factor, consistent 
with the idea that small stocks and growth stocks generate more heterogeneity in investor 
beliefs. Our results show that the book-to-market ratio is negatively related to 
heterogeneous beliefs, also implying that growth stocks have more dispersion in investor 
beliefs than value stocks. The second factor explains about 29% of common variance.   
  Table 6 Panel B presents results of the factor analysis using the maximum 
likelihood method. As with the principal factoring method, two factors are extracted. The 
first factor measures firm size and is related to systematic risks and explains 71% of 
common variance while the second factor is associated with belief differences and 
explains 29% of common variance. To estimate a latent factor for subsequent analysis, it 
is necessary to assign a value for each latent factor. We use factor score coefficients to 
estimate each latent factor as a linear combination of the proxies.  
 
C. Results Based on Latent Factors 
 The correlation between the skew and factor 1 (size factor) is 0.09 (0.11). Fama 
and French (1992) argue that firm size is a priced risk factor.  Thus, our result suggest 
that systematic risk may be an important determining factor for variation in firm-level 
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risk neutral skews as proposed in the paper of Duan and Wei (2009). The correlation 
between the skew and factor 2 (heterogeneous belief factor) is –0.25 (–0.24), confirming 
the negative relation between belief differences and the skew of risk neutral density for 
individual firms:  the greater the belief differences, the more negative the skew. 
 To tell whether the latent factor for heterogeneous beliefs does a better job of 
explaining risk neutral skewness than individual proxies, we use the estimated latent 
factor to sort stocks into five quintile portfolios. The mean and median skews are 
reported in Table 7. Stocks with a greater magnitude of the latent factor for 
heterogeneous beliefs (Factor 2) have more negative skew, supporting the argument that 
stocks with greater belief heterogeneity have more pronounced volatility smiles. The 
differential skews between the highest and lowest belief heterogeneity quintiles are 
significantly different from zero. Quintiles sorted on the latent factor 1 do not exhibit a 
monotonic pattern in the skew. 
[Insert Table 7 here] 
We also conduct a cross-sectional regression of the skew variable on latent factors 
and report results in Table 8. Factor 1 is positively related to the skew, consistent with 
previous results that small firms (or risky firms) have more negative skews. Factor 2 is 
negatively related to the skew, also consistent with previous results and supporting the 
hypothesis that the latent factor for heterogeneous beliefs is negatively related to the 
skew. The absolute value of t-statistics for the coefficients of Factor 2 is relatively larger 
compared to that of proxies for heterogeneous beliefs shown in Table 3.  
The latent factor has a stronger relationship with the skew than the individual 
proxy variables. The adjusted R-square is also higher relative to the adjusted R-square of 
regressions on any single proxy. These results indicate that the latent factor is a less noisy 
measure of heterogeneous beliefs. Also the heterogeneous belief factor explains more 
 22
variation in the risk neutral density of individual firms than the risk-based factor 
(factor1), consistent with Dennis and Mayhew (2002) who suggest firm specific factors 
are more important than systematic risk in explaining the skew. When both factors are 
included in the regressions, the coefficients on factor 1 changes sign and become less 
significant. This may be due to the multicollineality problem: factor 1 and factor 2 are 
both correlated with the liquidity in both options and stocks. 
 [Insert Table 8 here] 
  In addition, we conduct the pooled cross-sectional time-series regression of the 
skew using latent factors Table 9 presents the regression results. The signs and 
significance of both factors are the same as the cross-sectional results. Market volatility 
becomes insignificant when the latent factor for heterogeneous beliefs is included in the 
regression. This may be due to the correlation between the belief differences and market 
volatility: investor belief differences tend to be greater during a period of higher market 
volatility.  
[Insert Table 9 here] 
VI. Discussion  
The hypothesis that heterogeneous beliefs cause greater skewness in option prices 
is related to the price pressure hypothesis examined by Bollen and Whaley (2004).  
Specifically, it is possible that belief differences cause equilibrium option prices to have 
greater skew in the absence of price pressure.  It is also possible that belief differences 
cause investors to trade in ways that put pressure on option prices, moving them away 
from the price they would have if options were priced by dynamic arbitrage.  To examine 
these two possibilities, we look at the sensitivity of skewness to dispersion in beliefs as a 
function of the liquidity of the option.   
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Using option trading volume as a proxy for option liquidity, we sort options into 
quintiles based on liquidity.  Within each quintile, we test the relationship between 
heterogeneous beliefs and the skew.  From Table 10, we can see that skewness is more 
sensitive to belief differences for the less liquid securities. But the relationship between 
heterogeneous beliefs and skewness still holds after we control for liquidity as shown in 
Table 3 & 4.  This result suggests that the effect of belief differences on skew goes 
beyond the net buying pressure suggested by Bollen and Whaley (2004). 
[Insert Table 10 here] 
Another issue, tangential to the main focus of our paper, is the relationship 
between leverage and skewness, which has been disputed in the prior literature.  Toft and 
Prucyk (1997) report a negative relationship between leverage and skewness, while 
Dennis and Mayhew find that this relationship disappears after controlling for other 
factors.  The results throughout our analysis are generally consistent with Toft and 
Prucyk, supporting the hypothesis that firms with more leverage have more negative 
skews.  One exception to this is in Table 4, where we find a positive coefficient on 
leverage.  This particular result could be driven by the multicollinearity between leverage 
and the B/M ratio (Table 2 reports that the correlation is 0.657).10 
Overall, the negative relationship between leverage and skewness is somewhat 
sensitive to model specification and how the skew is measured.  We view this result 
                                                 
10 In a previous version of the paper, we examined the slope of the implied volatility as a function of both 
the right (positive) skew and left (negative) skew.  We found a negative relationship between the leverage 
and the negative skew (using OTM puts), which was consistent with Toft and Prucyk (1997).  However, we 
found a positive relationship between the leverage and the positive skewness (using OTM calls).  The risk-
neutral skewness in the current version is constructed using both OTM puts and OTM calls, and thus is a 
composite of these two results.   
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cautiously, and since it is not the focus of the current paper, we leave a more definitive 
examination of the relationship for future work.     
VII. Conclusion 
Buraschi and Jiltsov (2006) show that belief differences can affect the skewness 
of the risk neutral density function.  We find that stocks with greater belief heterogeneity 
have more negative risk neutral skewness. Small stocks and stocks with low earnings-to-
price ratios have more negative skewness than large stocks and stocks with high 
earnings-to-price ratios, respectively. Risk-neutral skewness is correlated with out-of-the-
money option open interest, the dispersion in financial analysts’ earnings forecasts, 
idiosyncratic volatility and stock trading volume, all of which are widely used proxies for 
heterogeneous beliefs in literature. More generally our results support the hypothesis that 
belief differences help explain the cross-sectional variation of risk neutral skewness.   
This study also uses factor analysis to identify a latent variable that represents 
heterogeneous beliefs by combining variables frequently used as proxies for 
heterogeneous beliefs:  option open interest, the dispersion in financial analysts’ earnings 
forecasts, idiosyncratic volatility, stock trading volume, firm size, the earnings-to-price 
and the book-to-market ratio. Factor analysis also identifies a factor linked to systematic 
risk.  The belief factor explains more variation in risk-neutral skewness than the risk-
based factor, which supports the argument of Dennis and Mayhew (2002) that firm-
specific factors are more important than systematic factors in explaining the cross-
sectional variation of skewness.  The impact on option prices goes beyond the net buying 
pressure argued by Bollen and Whaley (2004). Our results suggest that investor belief 
differences may be the unexplained firm-specific factor which impacts the price of stock 
options. 
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics  
This table presents descriptive statistics for variables that are used in empirical testing. The sample includes 
67,910 weekly observations of 856 unique firms during January 2003 to December 2006. SKEW is the BKM 
risk neutral skewness measure. The upper and lower 5% of SKEW are trimmed. OPEN INTEREST is the 
average daily open interest on all OTM options. DISPERSION is the dispersion of financial analysts' forecasts 
for quarter earnings, measured by the standard deviation of forecasts scaled by the absolute value of the mean 
forecast. IDIOSYNCRATIC VOLATILITY is the estimated standard deviation of daily stock returns using 
the market model for the past 200 days. STOCK VOLUME is the daily stock trading volume averaged 
weekly. SIZE is the natural logarithm of the market capitalization. E/P is the earnings-to-price ratio, computed 
as the quarterly earnings divided by the market price. B/M is the book-to-market ratio, computed as the 
quarterly book value of common equity divided by the market price. OPTION VOLUME is the average daily 
trading volume of OTM options. LIQUIDITY is the stock's bid-ask spread, computed as the (ask price - bid 
price)/ ask price. LEVERAGE is the debt-to-equity ratio computed as the long term debt divided by the 
market capitalization. BETA is estimated by the market model for the past 200 days using daily data. 
MARKET VOLATILITY is the standard deviation of daily returns of value-weighted index including 
distributions for the past 200 days.  
 
Panel A: Dependent Variable - SKEW 
Year Obs P25 Median P75 Standard Deviation 
2003 14236 –3.097 –1.623 –0.907 1.568 
2004 16730 –2.634 –1.425 –0.804 1.490 
2005 17410 –3.058 –1.613 –0.871 1.584 
2006 19534 –2.691 –1.339 –0.745 1.557 
Total 67910 –2.859 –1.484 –0.820 1.553 
Panel B: Proxy for Heterogeneous Beliefs 
Variables Obs P25 Median P75 Standard Deviation 
OPEN INTEREST (in millions) 67910 0.003 0.009 0.035 0.155 
DISPERISON 64091 0.030 0.067 0.159 0.557 
IDIOSYNCRATIC RISK  67909 0.019 0.025 0.032 0.011 
STOCK VOLUME (in millions) 67893 0.304 0.683 1.764 6.615 
SIZE 67893 19.994 20.723 21.763 1.351 
E/P 66993 –0.015 0.024 0.042 0.123 
B/M 65282 0.189 0.298 0.471 0.639 
 30
Panel C: Control Variables 
Variables Obs P25 Median P75 Standard Deviation 
OPTION VOLUME (in thousands) 67910 0.041 0.230 1.203 7.142 
LIQUIDITY 67893 0.026 0.034 0.045 0.015 
LEVERAGE 66104 0.000 0.004 0.123 0.668 
BETA 67910 1.090 1.479 1.936 0.628 
MARKET VOALTILITY 67910 0.006 0.007 0.008 0.003 
 
 
Table 2. Correlations between Variables 
 
This table presents correlations between variables that are used in empirical testing.  All variables are defined in Table 1.  Correlations in bold are discussed in the text. 
 
  
  SKEW 
OPTION 
VOLUME LIQUIDITY LEVERAGE BETA 
OPEN  
INTEREST DISPERISON 
IDIOSYNCRATIC
 VOLATILITY 
STOCK 
VOLUME SIZE E/P B/M 
OPTION VOLUME 0.041 
LIQUIDITY –0.116 –0.029 
LEVERAGE –0.049 –0.028 0.019 
BETA –0.088 –0.024 0.283 0.011 
OPEN INTEREST  –0.035 0.735 –0.118 –0.021 –0.040 
DISPERISON –0.087 –0.040 0.076 0.045 0.023 –0.037 
 
IDIOSYNCRATIC  
VOLATILITY 
–0.148 –0.067 0.573 0.016 0.250 –0.115 0.079  
STOCK VOLUME –0.076 0.624 –0.021 –0.023 0.010 0.773 –0.028 –0.086 
SIZE 0.181 0.462 –0.395 –0.069 –0.086 0.549 –0.151 –0.476 0.491 
E/P 0.216 0.031 –0.253 –0.095 –0.073 0.020 –0.084 –0.288 0.005 0.206 
B/M –0.109 –0.057 0.005 0.657 –0.007 –0.055 0.040 0.015 –0.039 –0.152 –0.048 
MARKET VOALTILITY –0.046 –0.032 0.207 0.018 –0.082 –0.029 –0.006 0.273 0.014 –0.060 –0.120 0.061 
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Table 3. Cross-sectional Regression of Risk Neutral Skewness 
This table presents the time-series averages of the coefficients from weekly cross-sectional regressions using the BKM risk neutral skewness, described in the 
text, as the dependent variable. The sample includes weekly observations during January 2003 to December 2006. Newey-West t-statistics (in parentheses) are 
reported. All variables are as defined in Table 1. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)  (9) 
OPTION VOLUME 0.008 *** 0.061 *** 0.044 *** 0.006 *** 0.05 *** –0.017 *** 0.006 *** –0.003 * 0.05 *** 
(4.85) (15.39) (2.83) (3.38) (17.38) (–8.73) (4.00) (–1.91) (12.92) 
LIQUIDITY –13.421 *** –15.607 *** –12.037 *** –8.451 *** –13.934 *** –4.861 *** –7.049 *** –13.027 *** –2.565 *** 
(–16.04) (–16.58) (–13.78) (–9.93) (–17.03) (–5.61) (–8.49) (–16.47) (–2.99) 
LEVERAGE –0.253 *** –0.240 *** –0.270 *** –0.248 *** –0.253 *** –0.234 *** –0.151 *** –0.124 *** –0.098 *** 
(–7.94) (–7.97) (–6.95) (–7.75) (–8.13) (–7.32) (–6.44) (–3.90) (–3.83) 
BETA –0.19 *** –0.193 *** –0.203 *** –0.156 *** –0.167 *** –0.226 *** –0.173 *** –0.146 *** –0.177 *** 
(–5.99) (–6.15) (–6.26) (–5.09) (–5.75) (–6.85) (–6.60) (–5.90) (–7.15) 
OPEN INTEREST  –2.478 *** –1.474 *** 
  (–18.77) (–9.48) 
DISPERISON –0.362 *** –0.181 *** 
(–14.41) (–8.41) 
IDIOSYNCRATIC VOLATILITY  –13.094 *** –3.492 ** 
(–10.62) (–2.60) 
STOCK VOLUME –0.055 *** –0.049 *** 
(–21.68) (–15.58) 
SIZE 0.216 *** 0.109 *** 
(20.98) (9.41) 
E/P 3.45 *** 3.352 *** 
(23.92) (22.45) 
B/M –1.299 *** –1.184 *** 
(–27.46) (–25.23) 
Mean Adjusted R^2 (%) 4.60   6.13   5.67   5.37   6.62   6.84   8.69   8.65   16.74   
 
 
 33
 
Table 4. Regression of Risk Neutral Skewness 
This table presents pooled cross-sectional time-series regression results with the BKM risk neutral skewness, described in the text, as the dependent variable. The sample 
includes weekly observations during January 2003 to December 2006. Newey-West corrected estimates and t-statistics (in parentheses) are reported. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
INTERCEPT –0.202 *** –0.212 *** –0.197 *** –0.219 *** –1.208 *** –0.275 *** –0.196 *** –1.187 *** 
(–12.17) (–12.59) (–11.87) (–13.27) (–16.31) (–15.90) (–11.56) (–12.33) 
OPTION VOLUME 0.007 *** 0.001 ** 0.001 *** 0.006 *** –0.002 *** 0.001 *** 0.001 ** 0.006 *** 
(8.84) (2.42) (2.70) (10.06) (–3.97) (3.02) (2.26) (7.86) 
LIQUIDITY –0.981 *** –0.456 0.997 *** –0.696 *** 0.978 *** 0.366 –0.56 ** 2.245 *** 
(–3.50) (–1.57) (3.15) (–2.51) (3.25) (1.30) (2.00) (6.60) 
LEVERAGE –0.026 *** –0.025 *** –0.026 *** –0.027 *** –0.022 *** –0.017 *** 0.023 *** 0.02 *** 
(–4.68) (–4.35) (–4.72) (–4.81) (–3.86) (–2.91) (3.39) (3.02) 
BETA –0.05 *** –0.052 *** –0.041 *** –0.048 *** –0.055 *** –0.051 *** –0.052 *** –0.049 *** 
(–8.06) (–8.22) (–6.54) (–7.74) (–8.91) (–8.23) (–8.34) (7.41) 
MARKET VOALTILITY –3.385 ** –3.082 * –0.385 –2.919 * –4.836 *** –2.254 –3.586 ** 0.464 
(–2.11) (–1.87) (–0.24) (–1.82) (–3.01) (–1.39) (–2.19) (0.27) 
SKEWt–1 0.826 *** 0.826 *** 0.827 *** 0.825 *** 0.824 *** 0.821 *** 0.825 *** 0.805 *** 
(304.05) (291.07) (305.55) (302.86) (299.73) (290.91) (294.91) (257.50) 
OPEN INTEREST  –0.343 *** –0.302 ** 
  (–8.00) (–4.96) 
DISPERISON –0.046 *** –0.029 *** 
(–6.17) (–4.03) 
IDIOSYNCRATIC RISK  –4.498 *** –1.846 *** 
(–10.47) (–3.64) 
STOCK VOLUME –0.007 *** –0.008 *** 
(–8.41) (–6.34) 
SIZE 0.045 *** 0.042 *** 
(14.09) (10.11) 
E/P 0.567 *** 0.665 *** 
(112.06) (12.31) 
B/M –0.074 *** –0.065 *** 
(–6.96) (–5.85) 
Adjusted R^2 (%) 69.36   69.06   69.38   69.37   69.41   69.43   69.11   69.32   
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Table 5. Skewness of Quintiles 
This table presents mean and median BKM skewness for quintiles of stocks sorted based on the stated proxies for heterogeneous beliefs. Each week stocks are 
assigned to one of the five quintiles based on the value for the particular proxy variable.  The proxy variables are as described in Table 1. 
Panel A. Quintiles of Proxy Variables for Heterogeneous Beliefs 
  OPEN INTEREST   DISPERSION   
IDIOSYNCRATIC 
VOLATILITY STOCK VOLUME   SIZE   E/P   B/M 
Quintiles Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
1(Small) –2.12 –1.73 –1.83 –1.35 –1.71 –1.35 –2.05 –1.64 –2.71 –2.56 –2.81 –2.62 –1.63 –1.20 
2 –1.98 –1.46 –1.55 –1.17 –1.74 –1.29 –1.88 –1.38 –2.06 –1.56 –2.12 –1.61 –1.68 –1.21 
3 –1.95 –1.36 –1.84 –1.33 –2.01 –1.46 –1.95 –1.39 –1.78 –1.27 –1.66 –1.23 –1.85 –1.35 
4 –1.92 –1.37 –2.19 –1.71 –2.22 –1.67 –1.98 –1.42 –1.75 –1.24 –1.66 –1.24 –2.17 –1.68 
5(Large) –2.07 –1.54 –2.45 –2.02 –2.36 –1.95 –2.18 –1.62 –1.74 –1.30 –1.78 –1.34 –2.61 –2.25 
Q5–Q1 0.05 0.19 –0.62 –0.67  –0.65 –0.60 –0.13 0.02   0.97 1.26  1.03 1.28 –0.98 –1.04 
  (2.54) (4.35)   (–31.94) (–29.96)   (–36.00) (–28.26) (–6.27) (3.39)   (52.76) (50.69)   (53.44) (50.41)   (–51.86) (–48.53) 
 
 
Panel B. Control for Size 
  OPEN INTEREST   STOCK VOLUME 
Quintiles Mean Median Mean Median 
1(Small) –1.53 –1.16 –1.47 –1.16 
2 –1.73 –1.23 –1.59 –1.17 
3 –1.89 –1.38 –1.83 –1.34 
4 –2.26 –1.78 –2.30 –1.84 
5(Large) –2.63 –2.41 –2.85 –2.74 
Q5–Q1 –1.11 –1.24 –1.38 –1.58 
  (–63.12) (–57.36)   (–79.54) (–68.62) 
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Table 6. Factor Analysis 
This table presents results of the factor analysis. Panel A presents results using principal factoring method and Panel B presents results using maximum 
likelihood method. Each proxy variable is standardized by substracting its mean and then dividing by its standard deviation. The prior communality 
estimate for each variable is set to its squared multiple correlation of each variable with all remaining variables. Varimax orthogonal rotation method is 
employed to rotate factors. 
 
Panel A: Principal Factoring Method Panel B: Maximum Likelihood Method 
  Factor Pattern Factor Score    Factor Pattern Factor Score 
Factor1 Factor2 Factor1 Factor2 Factor1 Factor2 Factor1 Factor2 
OPEN INTEREST 0.75 0.37 0.20 0.32 OPEN INTEREST 0.72 0.45 0.11 0.40 
DISPERISON –0.30 0.38 –0.05 0.17 DISPERISON –0.31 0.30 –0.02 0.09 
IDIOSYNCRATIC RISK –0.42 0.57 –0.04 0.31 IDIOSYNCRATIC RISK –0.49 0.60 –0.05 0.36 
STOCK VOLUME 0.79 0.33 0.22 0.39 STOCK VOLUME 0.77 0.44 0.16 0.52 
SIZE 0.91 –0.15 0.58 –0.37 SIZE 0.97 –0.11 0.75 –0.48 
E/P 0.19 –0.49 0.03 –0.22 E/P 0.21 –0.39 0.01 –0.12 
B/M –0.31 –0.15 –0.02 –0.09 B/M –0.31 –0.09 –0.01 –0.03 
Variance explained 71% 29%      Variance explained 71% 29%       
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Table 7. Skewness of Quintiles using Latent Factors 
This table presents mean and median BKM skewness of stocks sorted by one of the latent factors identified and 
reported in Table 6. Each week stocks are assigned into five quintiles based on the stated latent factor. 
 
Panel A: Principle Factoring Method Panel B: Maximum Likelihood Method 
Latent Factor 1  Latent Factor 2 Latent Factor 1  Latent Factor 2 
Quintiles Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
1(Small) –2.63 –2.43 –1.51 –1.20 –2.60 –2.38 –1.49 –1.19 
2 –1.95 –1.45 –1.62 –1.21 –1.96 –1.47 –1.62 –1.20 
3 –1.67 –1.19 –1.78 –1.32 –1.71 –1.21 –1.80 –1.33 
4 –1.72 –1.23 –2.16 –1.66 –1.73 –1.23 –2.20 –1.69 
5(Large) –1.84 –1.36 –2.72 –2.51 –1.79 –1.34 –2.69 –2.47 
Q5–Q1 0.79 1.07 –1.21 –1.31 0.81 1.04 –1.20 –1.28 
  (41.37) (39.89)  (–65.40) (–55.23)   (41.47) (40.40)  (–65.01) (–54.46) 
 
 
 
Table 8. Cross-sectional Regression on latent Factors 
This table presents the time-series averages of the coefficients from weekly cross-sectional regressions of the BKM risk neutral skewness on selected 
control variables described in Table 1; and the latent factors reported in Table 6. The sample includes weekly observations during January 2003 to 
December 2006. Newey-West t-statistics are reported in parentheses. 
 Principle Factoring Method Maximum Likelihood Method 
OPTION 
VOLOUME –0.008 *** 0.035 *** 0.046 *** –0.013 *** 0.040 *** 0.051 *** 
(3.17) (18.40) (15.89) (5.94) (18.86) (15.01) 
LIQUIDITY –10.202 *** 1.98 ** 1.464 –8.284 1.302 1.123 
(–10.86) (2.21) (1.54) (–8.85) (1.49) (1.21) 
LEVERAGE –0.275 *** –0.235 *** –0.237 *** –0.271 *** –0.240 *** –0.240 *** 
(–6.86) (–6.74) (–6.84) (–6.78) (–6.60) (–6.67) 
BETA –0.22 *** –0.166 *** –0.156 *** –0.224 *** –0.172 *** –0.158 *** 
(–6.31) (–5.73) (–5.60) (–6.40) (–5.74) (–5.56) 
Factor 1 0.120 *** –0.061 *** 0.171 *** –0.049 **** 
  (7.48) (–3.43) (11.74) (–2.70) 
Factor 2 –0.6 *** –0.628 *** –0.52 *** –0.553 *** 
(–37.75) (–38.26) (–35.07) (–33.3) 
Mean Adjusted R2 
(%) 5.07   10.55   10.74     5.4   10.35   10.6   
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Table 9. Regression of Risk Neutral Skewness on Latent Factors 
This table presents pooled regression results of the BKM risk neutral skewness on selected control variables described in Table 1; and the latent factors 
reported in Table 6. Newey-West corrected estimates and t-statistics (in parentheses) are reported. 
 Principle Factoring Method Maximum Likelihood Method 
INTERCEPT –0.223 *** –0.403 *** –0.406 *** –0.234 *** –0.039 *** –0.397 *** 
(-12.65) (-20.41) (-20.58) (-13.18) (-19.87) (-20.11) 
OPTION VOLOUME –0.001 0.007 *** 0.007 *** –0.002 *** 0.008 *** 0.007 *** 
(–1.48) (12.41) (8.56) (–2.75) (13.47) (9.03) 
LIQUIDITY 0.067 2.42 *** 2.584 *** 0.426 2.21 *** 2.437 *** 
(–0.21) (7.53) (7.87) (–1.34) (6.86) (7.42) 
LEVERAGE –0.021 *** –0.031 *** –0.03 *** –0.02 *** –0.023 *** –0.022 *** 
(3.51) (–4.44) (–4.32) (3.37) (–3.74) (–3.58) 
BETA –0.055 *** –0.043 *** –0.044 *** –0.055 *** –0.044 *** –0.045 *** 
(–8.44) (6.70) (6.76) (–8.53) (–6.79) (–6.90) 
MARKET VOALTILITY –3.979 ** –0.28 –0.44 –4.183 ** –0.422 –0.675 
(–2.36) (–0.17) (–0.26) (–2.48) (–0.25) (–0.40) 
SKEWt–1 0.826 *** 0.812 *** 0.812 *** 0.825 *** 0.813 *** 0.813 *** 
(284.75) (268.22) (268.19) (283.59) (269.50) (269.43) 
Factor 1 0.026 *** 0.01 0.038 *** 0.013 ** 
  (4.24) (1.59) (7.10) (2.21) 
Factor 2 –0.142 *** –0.142 *** –0.12 *** –0.117 *** 
(-20.33) (-20.33) (-19.16) (-17.76) 
Adjusted R^2 (%) 68.88   69.19   69.19     68.90   69.17   69.17   
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Table 10. Sensitivity of Skewness to Heterogeneous Beliefs across Option Liquidity Quintiles 
This table presents the coefficients on heterogeneous beliefs factor (latent factor 2) in the regression of risk neutral 
skewness for quintiles sorted on option liquidity proxied by Option Volume. Quintile 1 has the highest option trading 
volume while Quintile 5 has the lowest option trading volume. 
 
   Principle Factoring Method   Maximum Likelihood Method 
Quintile Cross-sectional Regression  Pooled Regression Cross-sectional Regression  Pooled Regression 
1 –0.31 –0.30 –0.25 –0.23 
2 –0.61 –0.58 –0.55 –0.52 
3 –0.67 –0.63 –0.59 –0.57 
4 –0.83 –0.74 –0.79 –0.74 
5 –1.00 –0.87   –1.00 –0.92 
 
 
